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Abstract
The recent literature on law and finance has drawn attention to the importance of creditor
rights in influencing the development of financial systems and in affecting firm corporate
governance and financing patterns.  Recent financial crises have also highlighted the
importance of insolvency systems – a key element of creditor rights – to prevent and
resolve corporate sector financial distress.  The literature and crises have highlighted the
role that creditor rights play in not only affecting the efficiency of ex-post resolution of
distressed corporations, but also in influencing ex-ante risk-taking incentives and an
economy’s degree of entrepreneurship more generally.  Yet, little is known on how much
formal insolvency systems are actually being used, how the use of the courts to resolve
financial distress relates to creditor rights, and whether any specific creditor rights matter
more.  This paper starts with documenting how often bankruptcy is used in a panel of 35
countries.  It next investigates the relation between specific design features of insolvency
regimes and the use of bankruptcy, considering also the quality of countries’ judicial
systems.  We find, controlling for overall development and macroeconomic shocks, that
bankruptcies are higher in common-law countries and in market-oriented financial
systems. Stronger creditor rights are generally associated with more use of bankruptcy,
except for the presence of a “stay on assets” that is associated with fewer use of
bankruptcy. Greater judicial efficiency is associated with more use of bankruptcy, but
there is some substitution between stronger creditor rights and greater judicial efficiency.
These findings suggest that the relationship between specific creditor rights features and
the use of bankruptcy systems is more complex than perhaps thought. It may also help
clarify the relationships between creditor rights, the development of financial systems,
corporate ownership, and financing patterns.2
1.        Introduction
 The growing literature on law and finance, starting with the work by La Porta,
Lopez de  Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), has drawn attention to the
importance of the strength of equity and creditor rights in influencing the development of
financial systems and in affecting firm corporate governance and financing patterns.
This literature finds that greater investor protection encourages the development of
capital markets and that countries that better protect creditors have more developed credit
markets.  Although various aspect of the strength of equity rights have been extensively
studied, less attention has been devoted the features and impact of creditor rights.
Important aspects of creditor rights are the specific features of a country’s insolvency
regime and its enforcement.  Recent financial crises have further highlighted the
importance of well-functioning insolvency systems in preventing and resolving corporate
sector financial distress.  More generally, there is increased interest globally in the design
of insolvency systems from a point of resource allocation, efficiency, and stability as well
as equality and fairness (Stiglitz 2001 and Hart 2000 review).
An insolvency regime tries to balance several objectives, including protecting the
rights of creditors and other stakeholders – essential to the mobilization of capital for
investment and working capital and other resources – and obviating the premature
liquidation of viable firms.  A good insolvency regime should also prevent managers and
shareholders from taking imprudent loans and lenders from giving loans with a high
probability of default.  At the same time, the insolvency regime should provide for a
degree of entrepreneurship in the economy more generally.  An insolvency regime should
also deliver an ex-post efficient outcome, in the sense that the highest total value is3
obtained for the distressed firm with the least direct costs and loss in going concern
value.
To achieve these objectives, insolvency regimes include a number of features.
These include whether the law provides for an automatic trigger when a company needs
to file for bankruptcy, who can file for reorganization or liquidation, the weight given to
the debtor, the creditors (bank loans, trade financing), the company’s management, and
the other stakeholders in preparing reorganization proposals, the ability of management
to stay during the reorganization, and whether an automatic stay of assets (moratorium)
exists. The working of countries’ judicial systems further complicates balancing these
incentives.  In addition to adequate legal rights, there is a need for an efficient judicial
system to enforce these rights, or at least to serve as a credible threat.
The analytical literature and recent financial crises have highlighted the complex
role of creditor.  As the structure of economic production and the values of stakeholders
are continuously changing – often in response to crises – many countries are currently
reevaluating the features of their creditor rights regimes and how their insolvency
systems deal with financially distressed firms.  This has proven to be a complicated area
in many countries, with discussions on reform taking considerable time.  Reforms may
have been protracted in part because of the important implications of any changes for the
distribution of wealth and control in an economy, raising in turn complex political
economy issues.  Reforms may have also been hampered by the lack of empirical
evidence across countries on the effects of different bankruptcy designs.4
While more data are being collected on differences in bankruptcy regimes across
countries,
1 to date little is known on the effects of specific creditor right features and their
interaction with the judicial system and other country characteristics.  The cross-country
empirical evidence has largely been limited to the general effects of creditor rights.
  Even
here the evidence has been mixed, with some finding only limited or no significance of
the aggregate strength of creditor rights on financial development.  Furthermore, the
precise channels through which a country’s institutional inheritance affects its financial
development and what aspects of legal systems are most important for firm financing are
still being investigated.
2
 One indirect measure that may help shed light on these issues is the actual use of
bankruptcy as a means to resolve financial distress and the relationship between actual
use and a country’s institutional features, including its creditor rights, legal heritage and
judicial system.  To date, however, it is not known how often bankruptcy is actually
being used in countries around the world.  Neither is it known whether its usage varies by
country characteristics like differences in legal systems and insolvency standards, or by
differences in the development of financial and capital markets and general
macroeconomic conditions.
                                                
1 The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank
have started to document the detailed features of bankruptcy systems in many countries.
The World Bank has also undertaken a review of desirable principles and guidelines for
bankruptcy systems.  Furthermore, data are being collected on the actual workings of
bankruptcy regimes for a large number of countries.5
The purpose of  this paper is to explore the relative importance of country
characteristics and the effect of different types of creditor rights that can help explain the
relative use of bankruptcy.  For this, we collect from various government and private
sources a unique dataset of the number of commercial bankruptcy filings in 35 countries.
Almost all countries in our sample have laws protecting secured creditor rights and have
bankruptcy laws permitting both liquidation and restructuring of distressed firms.  There
is considerable variation, however, in how frequently these laws are resorted to through
formal bankruptcy filings.  The data on actual bankruptcies allows us to investigate
which legal design features and what macro, financial, and other country characteristics
affect the likelihood that creditors use formal bankruptcy procedures as a means of
resolving corporate financial distress.  To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to
document the actual usage of bankruptcy and to try to identify empirically the factors
affecting the use of bankruptcy across countries.
We find, correcting for overall financial development and macroeconomic
shocks, that bankruptcies are higher in common-law countries and in market-oriented
financial systems, suggesting more efficient judicial systems or more risk-taking in
common-law countries.  We find that greater judicial efficiency is associated with more
use of bankruptcy, but that the combination of stronger creditor rights – both aggregated
and evaluated separately by specific features – and greater judicial efficiency leads to less
                                                                                                                                                
2 Much research is being conducted, for example, on what aspects of a Common (Civil)
Law heritage help explain that such countries have more (less) developed equity and
financial markets.  More robust tests and indirect measures are being used to explore the
channels through which countries’ legal and institutional “structure” matter (see further
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, Beck, Levine and Loayza , 2000, Berglof and
Von Thadden, 1999, Coffee, 2000, La Porta et al., 2002, Rajan and Zingales, 1999 and
2002, and Stulz and Williamson, 2001).6
use of bankruptcy.  This suggests that stronger creditor rights and greater judicial
efficiency are to some extent substitutes. Interestingly, we find that the presence of a
“stay on assets”, that is, the inability of individual creditors to seize assets without going
to court, leads to fewer bankruptcies independently of the efficiency of the judicial
system.  These findings suggest that there are important ex-ante incentive effects of
insolvency systems, including encouraging less risky behavior and more out-of-court
settlements.  But our findings also suggest that efficient legal mechanisms themselves
may help corporations achieve speedy resolutions of financial distress.  In turn, these
finding may shed light on the debate of what are the precise channels through which a
country’s institutional structure affects its financial and general development.
2.   Previous Literature and Hypotheses
The central role played by law and regulatory institutions in the development of
financial markets in general and in corporate finance in particular has received
considerable attention in recent years.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) examine cross-country differences in the quality of laws, regulations, and
enforcement, including creditor rights.  They document considerable variation in the
protection offered to creditors and minority shareholders across countries.  They also find
a significant association between the legal origins of a country and the quality of investor
protection.  In particular, their findings show that common law countries (Anglo-Saxon)
generally provide more investor protection whereas civil law origin (French, German,
and Scandinavian) countries provide less investor protection.7
Importantly, the literature on law and finance has drawn attention to the
importance of equity and creditor rights in influencing the development of financial
systems and in affecting firm corporate governance, ownership, and financing patterns.
A number of papers have reported significant relationships between the legal framework
of a country and its financial development and economic growth and between investor
protection and legal origin and various corporate governance issues, such as firm
dividend payout policies, firm valuation, and corporate ownership structures.
3
To investigate these relationships in the case of creditor rights, La Porta et al.
(1998) created an index of CREDITOR RIGHTS consisting of the summation of four
dummy variables, with four the highest possible score.  The dummy variables they report
are: RESTRICTIVE REORGANIZATION, equal to 1 if the timetable for rendering a
judgment is less than 90 days, and 0 otherwise; MANAGEMENT DOES NOT STAY
(IN REORGANIZATION), equal to 1 if incumbent management does not stay during a
restructuring or bankruptcy, and 0 otherwise; NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON STAY,
equal to 1 if there is no automatic stay on assets (i.e., no moratorium on payments), and 0
otherwise; SECURED CREDITORS PAID FIRST, equal to 1 if secured creditors have
the highest priority in payment, and 0 otherwise.  La Porta et al. (1997) reports a positive
relationship between the ratio of domestic debt to GDP and this aggregate creditor right
index, although the creditor rights variable has only a 10% significance.  Controlling for
the country’s legal origin (Anglo-Saxon, French, Germanic, and Scandinavian) and the
                                                
3See Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000, La Porta et al., 1997 and 2002, Rajan and Zingales,
1995 and 1998, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999, and Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic,1998.8
existence of judicial efficiency in the country, the significance of the creditor rights
variable actually disappears.
Neither La Porta et al. (1997) nor the other papers on law and finance investigated
the effects of each specific sub-index of the Creditor Rights index on the development of
the credit markets.  We may expect, however, that there are considerable differences
between the effects of each specific creditor rights on firm and creditor behavior.  A
stipulation in the insolvency law that provides creditors with the right of no automatic
stay on assets, i.e., individual creditors are allowed to seize assets when a firm is in a
bankruptcy procedure, provides creditors with some bargaining power that may allow
them to more easily negotiate debt restructuring out of court as going into bankruptcy
will more likely trigger a liquidity crisis.  At the same time, no automatic stay may lead
to a creditor race to seize assets, thus possibly accelerating the possibility of financial
distress and bankruptcy.  Interestingly, work at the global level on developing principles
and guidelines for an effective insolvency and creditor right system suggests that there
should preferably be an automatic stay on assets for at least some initial period (World
Bank, 2001).  This varies from La Porta et al. (1998) whom consider in constructing their
index the absence of an automatic stay a positive creditor rights feature.  This suggests
that there are some differences of opinion on what constitute desirable creditor rights
features, which in turn may relate to our lack of understanding on how certain creditor
rights features affect actual bankruptcy use.
The presence in the law of secured creditor priority and absolute priority of
claims in bankruptcy or restructuring (i.e., senior creditors are paid first, then junior
creditors, followed finally by shareholders if any residual remains) is another example.9
Such priority may deter ex-ante risky financial behavior and thus reduce the likelihood of
financial distress.  Such feature can also help overcome creditor coordination problems
when a corporation is in restructuring.  At the same time, if the law stipulates that
shareholders receive nothing in bankruptcy, a firm’s shareholders may attempt to delay
or avoid bankruptcy, including undertaking more high-risk projects when the corporation
starts to run into financial distress.  Depending on whether the insolvency law stipulates
whether managers have to automatically leave when a firm is in bankruptcy, incentives
will vary whether managers will act or not on behalf of shareholders, creditors, or neither
and whether they will have incentive to take on more or less risks.
These discussions show that each of the specific creditor right features may
influence firm and creditor behavior differently and what constitutes a desirable creditor
right feature may depend on circumstances or objectives.
4  While we may expect the use
of bankruptcy to vary with the strength of (specific) creditor rights, this will also be
influenced by the ability of creditors to use these rights, which in turn will depend on the
efficiency of the judicial system.  Modigliani and Perotti (2000) draw attention to the
finding that when a country’s enforcement regime is unreliable, transactions may be
carried out through some form of private enforcement.  La Porta et al. (1997) show the
importance of the judicial system, in addition to formal legal rights, for financial market
development.  Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2000) argue that the quality of laws, as
                                                
4 Furthermore, while the work by La Porta et al. (1998) provides some detail on creditor
right features, obviously there are many other aspects in which insolvency regimes differ
across countries. The work at the World Bank on developing Principles and Guidelines
for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems mentions, for example, 35
principles countries could adopt or pursue.  The effects of these more detailed design
features may in turn be reflected in the relative use of bankruptcy across countries.
Unfortunately, data on more detailed features are not available in a systematic way.10
often measured by the country’s legal origin, is only a crude proxy for the effectiveness
of legal systems – instead it is the effective enforcement of laws rather than the quality of
laws that matters.
5
Whether courts are asked to help resolve financial distress may also similarly
depend on the efficiency of the judicial systems.  Creditors may be more likely to
undertake the costs of filing for bankruptcy if they are able to effectively use the courts in
the case of default.  A country with strong and efficient legal enforcement might thus see
more frequent use of the statutory provisions provided in the legal code.  At the same
time, if enforcement is strong, we may expect debtors and creditors to try to avoid risky
behavior, thereby reducing the chances of financial distress and bankruptcy.
Alternatively, if enforcement is weak, debtors and creditor may try to work out a
situation of financial distress through private negotiations, since the transaction costs of
using an inefficient enforcement system may be too high.  At the same time, in countries
with weak judicial systems, debtors may engage in more risky financial behavior, thus
leading to more financial distress.
6 This suggests that variations in enforcement
efficiency could cause differences in the use of formal bankruptcy procedures, even if
bankruptcy laws are broadly similar.
                                                
5 For transition economies, Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) show that the laws on the
books have limited effects on financial market development, but that measures of
effective enforcement do.  Rajan and Zingales (1999 and 2002) also provide evidence
that argues for factors other than legal origin as predictors of stock market development.
6 Large-scale corporate financial distress provides another specific setting to examine the
effects of the efficiency of the judicial system relative to the formal laws.  For example,
Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2002) found that in a sample of East Asian countries,
creditors are more likely to incur the costs of bankruptcy if ex-ante creditor rights and ex-
post judicial efficiency indicate a likely recovery of losses.11
The impact of the (lack of) judicial efficiency may also vary by specific creditor
right as the need for enforcement varies.  The absence of an automatic stay on assets
may, for example, be very valuable to creditors when the judicial system is weak as it can
force debtors to negotiate out of court.  But in a strong judicial system, the presence of an
automatic stay may be beneficial as it preserves the going concern value of firms in
reorganization, thereby reducing the chances of eventual bankruptcies, without
negatively affecting the value of creditors claims as an efficient court oversees the estate.
More generally, the features of an insolvency system are designed to deal with specific
issues, such as too risky behavior by debtors, creditor races to grab assets, the
preservation of going concern value, the maintenance of priorities among claims to
preserve incentives for monitoring, etc.  The degree to which the effectiveness of a
specific feature depends on the judicial system and its consequent relationship with actual
bankruptcy use is likely to differ.
In addition to exploring the relationship between the use of bankruptcy and the
features of creditor right regimes, we also want to investigate the relative role of bank-
oriented versus market-oriented financial systems.  As discussed by Allen and Gale
(2000), Levine (1999), and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), countries differ in the
structure of their financial system.  The relation of the orientation of the financial system
with the use of bankruptcy is unclear, however.  In bank-oriented economies, firms often
depend on a single, powerful banking relationship as a primary source of all forms of
external finance, which may include both debt and equity financing.  In market-oriented
economies, firms often have multiple bank lenders and widely held publicly traded
equity.  We would expect that the arms-length banking relationships found in market-12
oriented systems present more incentive for creditors to use formal bankruptcy measures
to coordinate among creditors.  As shown in Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), firms in the
United States that use in-court bankruptcy proceedings have a smaller percentage of debt
owed to banks and a greater number of lenders.
This suggests that creditors in market-based economies may benefit more from
those aspects of a bankruptcy law that aim to overcome collective action problems
among creditors.  Also, firms in bank-oriented economies tend to have closer
relationships with their primary bank and the bank may also have an equity investment in
the firm.  Creditors in bank-oriented economies may therefore have less need, or be less
inclined, to use formal (and costly) bankruptcy filings to resolve financial distress.
Evidence for Japan and Germany indeed suggests that borrowers’ main banks not only
help avoid costly financial distress, but also act as coordinators of financial support and
restructuring in times of financial distress. At the same time, in bank-based systems there
may be scope for conflicts of interest between the role of banks as creditor and as
equityholder, making the decision to file for bankruptcy less based on the interests of
debt claims alone.  More generally, a bank-oriented system may have more scope for
perverse relationships between financial institutions and corporations, which may deter
filings for bankruptcy. Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2002) show that firms in East
Asia with a bank as their controlling shareholder are less likely to use bankruptcy as a
means of resolving financial distress. On the other hand, since firms in bank-oriented
economies have typically a greater percentage of bank debt, we might expect higher
leverage to lead to a higher number of bankruptcies in bank-oriented systems.13
Furthermore, we want to test whether countries with more significant new
business entry restrictions have fewer bankruptcy filings. In previous literature, Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) find that entry and exit rates within industries are highly
correlated – industries with higher than average entry rates tend to also have higher than
average exit rates.  The lack of entry would make for a less competitive industry, which
in turn could imply fewer exits it profitability is kept high by entry barriers, as discussed
extensively in the industrial organization literature (i.e.,  Hopenhayn, 1992).
7  It could
also be that countries that have more efficient judicial systems also allow for easier entry,
which would mean that the rate of entry is a proxy for a country’s judicial efficiency.
We also want to explore the relationship of the distribution of firm size with the
occurrence of bankruptcy.  On one hand, a larger share of small firms may reduce the
number of bankruptcy relative to the total number of firms, as small firms are less likely
to incur the cost of a formal bankruptcy procedure.  On the other hand, small firms may
be more risky and consequently a large share of small firms in an economy may raise the
relative number of bankruptcies.
In addition to these variables, we also expect that the general development of the
country, the level of economic growth, the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis and
the level of real interest rates will affect the relative use of bankruptcy. We expect more
developed countries to have more market-based economies and to use formal bankruptcy
more often to resolve financial distress.  We expect countries experiencing negative
growth to have higher rates of defaults.  The occurrence of a systemic banking crisis may
indicate periods of not only economic slowdown but also a period during which
                                                
7 For a review of the literature see Caves (1998).14
borrowers are more constrained in finding additional bank financing and more likely to
file for bankruptcy.  Finally, we expect to find that higher real interest rates are associated
with more defaults it increases the cost of financing.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
The number of total commercial bankruptcy filings was collected from
government and private sources for 35 countries around the world for all available years
between 1990-1999.
8  We include both firms that file for liquidation and reorganization
under the bankruptcy code.  This measures the total use of the bankruptcy law and the
judicial system to resolve corporate financial distress.  In order to compare the relative
use of bankruptcy across countries, we need to normalize the number of bankruptcy
filings.  We use the total number of firms, as provided by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and official country statistical handbooks.
9   Tables 1 and 2
show some summary statistics for the countries in our sample panel.
To explain the relative use of bankruptcy, we include as explanatory  variables
measures of macroeconomic performance, financial structure, efficiency of judicial
system, other institutional measures, and the specific creditor rights discussed above.  We
expect that the number of failed firms  depends on a country's current and expected
                                                
8 See Appendix 1 for the country sources. In part because there is variation across
countries in the definition and implications of bankruptcy, we include all legal
proceedings designed to either liquidate or rehabilitate an insolvent firm.   Results were
qualitatively robust to analyzing only liquidation procedures for those countries that
identified those numbers separately.15
economic performance, as measured by the current income level and growth of GDP.
We include lagged real GDP per capita in US$, RGDPPCt-1, and the lagged 1-year
growth rate of real GDP, GDPGt-1.
10 We also control for periods of systemic banking
crises based on the data from  Caprio and Klingebiel (2000), D_CRISISt-1.  We also
include the lagged real interest rates, RINTERESTt-1,
We investigate the effect of a higher concentration of SMEs, measured as the
percentage of employment attributed to SMEs collected by Klapper and Sulla (2002) and
denoted here by SME_SHARE. To test whether countries with more significant entry
restrictions have fewer bankruptcy filings, we use the data collected in Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) on the restrictiveness of entry￿the time to
establish a new business￿to test whether entry and exit rates tend to be correlated across
countries.  This variable is called TIME. To measure the relative orientation of banks
versus equity markets, we include a dummy variable provided by  Demirgüc-Kunt and
Levine (1999), D_MKTORIENT, that identifies countries as market- versus bank-
oriented, depending on the relative importance of  intermediated (bank) versus direct
(capital) financial markets.
We include dummies to indicate legal origins – FRENCH, ENGLISH,
GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN, and TRANSITION.  These origins proxy broadly for
creditor rights, with English, common law countries being regarded as more creditor-
                                                                                                                                                
9 For seven countries, only the total number of manufacturing firms is available.  For
these countries we extrapolate the total number of firms by sector and legal origin
(English, French, etc.).  All empirical results are robust to the exclusion of these
countries.
10 The subscript, t, indicates a time series.  All other variables are constant over time, but
vary by country.16
friendly, whereas French, civil law countries are regarded as more debtor-friendly.
However, these variables also capture other aspects, including the adaptability of the
legal system and elements of the efficiency of the legal system.
We use the La Porta et al. (1998) data for the presence of certain legal features.
We use their index of CREDITOR RIGHTS, consisting of the summation of four dummy
variables, RESTRICTIVE REORGANIZATION, NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON
ASSETS, SECURED CREDITOR PRIORITY, and MANAGEMENT DOESN’T STAY,
with a highest possible score of four. We also use the individual sub-indexes. In addition
to legal origins, which are exogenously determined, and the presence of specific creditor
rights, we expect the implementation of laws and the efficiency of the judicial system in
the country to be a significant factor in the use of bankruptcy.  We therefore also include
an index of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment, RULE of LAW, as
reported for most countries by La Porta et al. (1998) and for transition economies by
Pistor (2000).  As an alternative measure regarding the efficiency of the judicial system,
we use a “legality” index, which is the weighted average of indexes provided by Business
International Corporation of the Efficiency of the Judiciary, Rule of Law, Corruption,
Risk of Expropriation, and Risk of Contract Repudiation (Berkowitz, et al., 2002).
11
The explanatory variables we use fall into several categories: general
development (RGPPPC), the state of the economy and business cycle (lagged GDPG,
D_CRISIS, R_INTEREST), the degree of entry and the structure of the economy (SME-
SHARE, TIME); the legal and financial structure of the economy (ORIGIN,
D_MKTORIENT), and the creditor rights and judicial system (CREDITOR RIGHT
                                                
11 This index is unavailable for transition economies.17
INDEX, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, and RULE OF LAW).  Since some of these variables
may capture similar determinants, we report the correlation coefficients between these
explanatory variables in Table 3.   The Table shows that in general, there is not a high
correlation between the various variables, with almost all correlation coefficients below
0.3, and many below 0.1.  The only exceptions are the correlation between D_CRISIS
and GDPG, which is -0.311, as systemic crisis are often accompanied by economic
declines and between R_INTEREST and RULE OF LAW, which is -0.370, as more
efficient legal systems tend to have lower real interest rates.  The other exception is
between RGDPPC and RULE OF LAW, which has actually a correlation of 0.774.  This
high correlation is to be expected as more developed countries will tend to have more
efficient judicial systems.
4.   Empirical Results
We set up the regressions as a panel of country and years.  Since we do not have
the same number of years in which we have observation on bankruptcy rates for each
country (Table 2), we have an unbalanced panel of at most 273 observations (for some
regression we have 252 observations as some variables are missing).  Our first regression
results are shown in Table 4.  The specification used always includes the level of GDP
per capita, RGDPPC, lagged GDP growth rate, GDPG, a dummy for whether the country
experienced a systemic financial crisis during the period, D_CRISIS, and the real interest
rate, R_INTEREST.  Columns (1-4) shows the base regression result where the
specification has no country dummies, while the column (5) regression does have
dummies.  In column 1, we find that countries with higher levels of real GDP per capita18
have higher uses of bankruptcy, with the coefficient significant at the 1% level.  This
suggests that greater overall development and more market-based economies are
consistent with greater judicial efficiency and more court usage.  Lagged GDP growth
rate has the expected negative sign, i.e., a growth slowdown increases the use of
bankruptcy, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.  The systemic
crisis dummy has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant.
12  The real
interest variable is also not statistically significant.
The next regression, Column 2, includes the market orientation variable.  The
significantly positive coefficient on D_MKTORIENT shows that bankruptcy use is
greater in countries with more use of market financing and less in bank-based systems.
This supports our hypothesis that countries in which banks have closer relationships with
borrowing firms and where there are less dispersed creditors, have less need for court-
driven coordination among creditors, and are thus less likely to use bankruptcy to resolve
distress.   The fact that leverage is higher in bank-based systems does not seem to
outweigh this effect.
Table 4, Column 3, shows the effect of the ease of new business entry on the use
of bankruptcy.  We find a significantly negative relationship between the time required to
operate a new business and the use of bankruptcy – countries in which it is more
restrictive and difficult to open a new business also have lower rates of bankruptcy.  One
explanation is that both procedures – registering a new business and filing for bankruptcy
                                                
12 This finding may reflect the reduction in access to financing during a crisis. Using the
percentage change in domestic credit (not reported) we find a significantly negative
coefficient, which suggests that bankruptcy filings increase during periods of reduced
access to financing.19
– are dependent on an efficient public sector, including an efficient judicial system.  This
seems not generally the case, however.  Germany, for example, which has a high index of
judicial efficiency, requires a relatively long time to start a new business, 90 working
days, and has a relatively low average bankruptcy rate of only 1.03% over the period
1992-98.  In contrast, Canada, which also has a high level of judicial efficiency, requires
only 2 days to start a new business and has a relatively high average bankruptcy rate of
2.96% over the period 1990-98.  The significant relationship may rather reflect that
countries that allow relatively easy business entry permit a more natural “learning-
curve”, during which relatively more firms are expected to fail, while countries that
require, for example, more documentation of qualifications and financial backing, may
have lower rates of business defaults.  Another, related explanation is that by restricting
competition through entry, countries assure the profitability and allow the survival of less
efficient firms, thus keeping the overall bankruptcy rate low.
In Column 4 we include the share in total employment of small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs).  This variable is collected from a variety of sources using different
definitions over a number of years. It is the only indicator available, may still not be a
robust indicator of the importance of small firms to the economy.  It is, however, very
significantly negative, suggesting that SMEs are less likely to use bankruptcy courts.
This may be because of the high fixed costs involved in using legal proceedings and
courts, which makes using formal bankruptcy to resolve financial distress less efficient
for SMEs.  Furthermore, SMEs may rely more on a smaller number of creditors, making
out of court negotiations more likely.  Also, SME failures may more likely  reflect full
“economic” distress as going concern values are low relative to liquidation values.  This20
suggests that SMEs that fail have less need for bankruptcy procedures to preserve going
concern value through formal distribution of firm assets and rather see (secured) creditors
liquidate the firm out of court.
13
Finally, in Column 5 we introduce individual country-dummies to correct for any
country differences.  We find that the significance of some of the variables changes.  In
particular, the level of GDP per capita and the lagged output growth rates are no longer
statistically significant, which can be expected as the country dummies control for much
of each country’s overall macroeconomic and institutional environment.  The systemic
crisis dummy becomes statistically significant, while the real interest rate has a positive,
but still insignificant sign. The fact that most country variables are not statistically
significant is not surprising since the regression includes country dummies that explain
most of the cross-country variation in bankruptcy usage.
We next introduce the legal variables for our complete sample.  We start with the
relationship between legal origins and bankruptcy rates.  Table 5, Column (1) shows that
countries with French and German civil law codes – which are typically categorized as
having weaker creditor rights and less efficient judicial systems – use bankruptcies
significantly less than countries in the common law orientations.
14  In addition, we find
that transition countries have lower use of bankruptcy, perhaps because their legal codes
and judicial systems are newer and because creditors and borrowers have less experience
using the courts to resolve distress.  It could also be that during  this period firms were
                                                
13 This result may also be partially explained by the high correlation between the size of
the SME sector and legal origins, and in turn the strength of creditor rights, as shown by
Klapper and Sulla (2002).21
(still) being bailed-out by banks and governments as there was a lack of hard-budget
constraints in many transition economies. Column (2) includes the index of rule of law,
which proxies for the efficiency of the legal environment.  We find this measure to be
significantly positively related to the occurrence of bankruptcy – the greater the
likelihood of a creditor speedily and successfully collecting in the court, the more likely
creditors are to use formal and costly bankruptcy proceedings in the case of default.
When we include both legal origin and rule of law, Column (3), we find that both are
statistically significant, but that the coefficient for the rule of law variable is smaller and
loses some of its significance.  This can probably be explained by the correlation between
the legal family of a country and the efficiency of its legal system (as already noted by La
Porta et al. (1998)).
15
Next we study the importance of the overall strength of creditor rights by
including the index CREDITOR RIGHTS in the regression in Column 4.  Interestingly,
the overall strength of creditor rights is negatively, but not significantly related to the
occurrence of bankruptcy across countries.  An argument could be made that on one hand
stronger rights deter bankruptcy – as debtors and creditors both avoid risky financing
patterns and prefer to negotiate out of court in times of financial distress.
16 On the other
hand, stronger rights may make bankruptcy procedures more effective and thus be used
                                                                                                                                                
14 The exception is Scandinavia, which has significantly higher bankruptcies than English
countries, although this may be a result of Scandinavia’s recent banking crisis and the
fact that all Scandinavian countries are high-income.
15 As a robustness check, we substitute the rule of law index with a “legality” index for
all regressions and we find that our results remain equally significant.  However, for
these regressions we cannot include the transition countries as the index is not available
for these countries.
16 However, often, even in the US, when parties reach an agreement outside of court they
frequently formally file for bankruptcy to avoid future contract disputes.22
more.  The net effect may be that the aggregate creditor rights are not significantly
related to the occurrence of bankruptcy.  When we also include the degree of judicial
efficiency in Column 5, we find that the coefficient for creditor rights remains
statistically insignificant.  This provides further support for the hypothesis that the overall
strength of creditor rights has two offsetting effects: the deterrence part, with a negative
relationship with bankruptcy use, and the efficiency of actual usage part, with a positive
relationship with bankruptcy use.  The latter relationship is picked up in part in  this
regression by the efficiency of the legal system, which thus weakens the deterrent part of
creditor rights, making the coefficient for creditor rights more negative, although still
insignificant.
Thus far our interpretation is based on an analysis of the strength of aggregate
creditor rights, and not yet its individual components.  As discussed before, each of the
four separate creditor rights may have a different effect on the occurrence of filing for
bankruptcy, which may explain why we did not find a statistically significant effect of
the aggregate creditor rights index on bankruptcy use.  We therefore next analyze the
relationship between the four separate indexes and the occurrence of bankruptcy, with
regression results reported in Table 6, repeating the regression with  tehe  oevrall
CREDITOR RIGHTS index in column 1.
17  Of the four subindexes, one is statistically
significantly positive – RESTRICTIVE REORGANIZATION in Column 2 – and one is
statistically significant negative – NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON ASSETS, in Column 3.
                                                
17 These regressions exclude transition economies since data on the subindices of creditor
rights is unavailable. As a result, the number of observations drops from 273 to 252.23
The other two subindexes, SECURED CREDITORS PAID FIRST and MANAGEMENT
DOES NOT STAY, are not statistically significant.
These differences suggest that the deterrence and actual bankruptcy usage effects
vary by creditor rights.  The presence of restrictions for going into reorganization, such as
creditors’ consent, seems to provide creditors with more legal tools and weakens the
debtor’s degrees of freedom, leading to more use of bankruptcy. The ability of secured
creditor to seize assets even when a firm has filed for reorganization (no automatic stay),
in contrast seems to deter usage of bankruptcy.  This suggests that the presence of an
automatic stays aimed at avoiding creditor races makes bankruptcy a more efficient tool
to use for creditors.  The no stay provision may, however, still be useful in weak judicial
environments as otherwise creditors may be too much as the discretion of the judicial
system.
Interestingly, the index of priority of secured creditors is not significant.  This
may indicate that the priority creditor right feature deters risky behavior and thus reduces
the probability of financial distress.  It may also be that laws permitting secured creditors
rights do not relate to usage of bankruptcy, but rather allow a creditor to seize its secured
assets out of court.  It may also be that the specific secured creditor right is less important
than having a business environment that allows, for example, easy registering of
collateral and the presence of courts which speedily enforce secured claims (before the
creditor can liquidate the asset).  The insignificant sign for the management does not stay
index may reflect that there is on one hand a deterrent effect of having to replace
management when using bankruptcy in those cases when incumbent management
provides using skills and know-how.  For other firms, there may in contrast be some24
value for creditors of being able to replace management immediately when using
bankruptcy procedures. For example, incumbent management may be delaying
unnecessary painful restructurings.  On balance, an insignificant sign results. Note that in
these regressions we control for the effects of the judicial efficiency on the likelihood of
bankruptcy by including our rule of law variable that consistently has a positive
relationship with the number of bankruptcies.
To further test for the interaction between the effects of judicial efficiency and the
individual and aggregate creditor rights, we run a set of regressions where we include, in
addition to the creditor rights (sub-) indexes and the judicial efficiency index, also the
interaction between the two indexes.  As shown in Table 7, we find that the coefficients
for the interaction variables between the aggregate creditor rights index and most of the
creditor rights subindexes have statistically significant negative signs, with the exception
of NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON ASSETS, which is significantly positive.  At the same
time, the creditor rights index and the  subindexes themselves are mostly statistically
significantly positive, with again the exception of the NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON
ASSETS index which is negative.
These regression results confirm our earlier results that speedy action by the
courts in itself leads to more usage of bankruptcy, as does the presence of stronger
creditor rights, except for NO AUTOMATIC STAY ON ASSETS.  The sign for the
interaction terms, however, suggests that there is some substitution between the two. In
countries with high judicial efficiency, speedy action by the courts substitutes to some
extent for strong creditor rights and encourages use of bankruptcy procedures. Well
functioning courts, for example, may judge appropriately the balance between the25
benefits and costs of having management stay or leave when filing for bankruptcy.  Well-
functioning courts may also provide the right judgement whether the debtor is
cooperative or not in making restructuring proposals. This substitution effects in turn
suggests that in countries with weak judicial proceedings creditors will use bankruptcy –
a costly resolution – only if they have very strong entitlements.  In others words, in weak
judicial settings, creditor rights may have to be stronger to compensate for inefficiencies
in the courts.
5. Conclusion
Creditor rights affect not only the ex-post resolution of distressed corporations,
but also influence ex-ante incentives and an economy’s degree of entrepreneurship more
generally.  In this paper, we explore the effect of various creditor rights on the actual use
of bankruptcy procedures.  We start with reporting the relative number of commercial
bankruptcy filings in 35 countries for the years 1990-99.  We use this data to investigate
which legal, financial and other country characteristics affect the likelihood that formal
bankruptcy procedures are used to resolve financial distress.  We find, correcting for
overall development and macroeconomic shocks, that market-oriented economies are
more likely to use bankruptcy than bank-oriented economies.  This may be attributed to
the weaker banking relationships and the stronger need for a legal framework to assist
with coordination among creditors. We find that countries with more efficient and speedy
procedures to open a new business have greater bankruptcy use.  This may reflect that
firm entry and exit rates are related as well as overall more effective legal and regulatory
processes.  And we find that the presence of more small and medium firms is associated26
with less usage of bankruptcy, which may reflect that the costs of using formal
bankruptcy procedures are too high for small firms.
We find that bankruptcies are higher in Anglo-Saxon countries, which may more
efficient judicial systems, but could also reflect these systems are more risky and
entrepreneurial.  We find that an overall index of stronger creditor rights is not associated
with more use of bankruptcy, but we find important differences in these effects by
individual creditor rights.  Specifically, we find that the presence of a “no automatic stay
on assets” is associated with fewer bankruptcies and the presence in the law of a
“restriction on reorganizations” with more bankruptcies.  These results are also not
independent of the efficiency of the judicial system.  We find that greater judicial
efficiency is associated with more use of bankruptcy, but that the combination of stronger
creditor rights with greater judicial efficiency leads to less use, suggesting some
substitution between strong rights and greater judicial efficiency.  These findings suggest
that there are important incentive effects of insolvency systems combined with good
judicial systems encouraging less risky behavior and more out-of-court settlements.
They also suggest that in countries with weak judicial proceedings, strong creditor rights
are more necessary to compensate for weaknesses in legal enforcement.27
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, by Country
Number of Bankruptcies was collected from sources listed in Appendix 1.  BNKRPT_FRM is the
ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.  Real GDP per capita in US$
(RGDPPC), 1-year growth rates of GDP (GGDP), and real interest rates (RINTEREST) are from














ARGENTINA 92-99 2,144.38 0.12 7,567.47 6.37 4.26
AUSTRALIA 90-99 5,505.17 2.10 21,120.16 4.47 8.50
AUSTRIA 90-99 2,065.10 1.33 28,774.78 2.58 3.73
BELGIUM 90-99 4,850.20 2.59 26,784.65 2.10 3.32
CANADA 90-98 12,696.67 2.96 19,280.07 1.93 6.29
CHILE 90-99 88.60 0.28 4,195.95 7.66 13.22
COLOMBIA 96-99 225.50 0.16 2,411.81 2.81 19.99
CZECH REPUBLIC 92-96 1,729.40 1.49 4,755.23 -0.78 -2.33
DENMARK 90-99 2,375.90 1.53 33,582.58 1.93 7.77
FINLAND 90-98 5,106.11 4.14 25,587.28 1.39 6.34
FRANCE 90-99 51,671.75 2.62 26,293.72 1.65 6.64
GERMANY 92-98 21,152.57 1.03 29,782.87 1.46 8.43
GREECE 90-94 857.4 0.29 10,987.33 1.20 9.18
HONG KONG 90-98 1,518.60 0.55 22,610.76 4.98 2.33
HUNGARY 92-96 8,425.40 1.99 4,252.39 -2.22 4.74
IRELAND 90-99 788.60 2.74 17,580.34 6.47 5.23
ITALY 90-96 8,663.14 0.54 18,431.58 1.61 7.64
JAPAN 90-99 14,000.60 0.22 41,709.64 2.18 3.61
NETHERLANDS 90-99 3,996.00 1.30 27,106.94 3.44 5.63
NEW ZEALAND 93-98 716.00 3.67 15,981.80 3.54 9.42
NORWAY 90-98 3,546.56 1.83 31,786.32 3.44 8.02
PERU 93-99 145.14 0.05 2,180.54 4.92 26.87
POLAND 90-96 3,319.57 0.23 2,984.64 0.99 -5.34
PORTUGAL 91-99 516.44 0.08 10,791.99 2.73 7.95
RUSSIA 95-98 2,770.75 0.31 2,274.35 -4.80 51.49
SINGAPORE 90-99 227.80 3.06 21,414.20 8.06 4.03
SOUTH AFRICA 90-99 2,918.60 4.62 3,944.43 1.38 6.54
SOUTH KOREA 90-98 162.67 0.17 9,780.62 5.75 3.29
SPAIN 90-99 518.60 0.02 14,764.81 2.59 5.91
SWEDEN 90-99 13,917.10 7.61 27,088.16 1.36 7.57
SWITZERLAND 90-98 9,212.56 3.33 44,345.91 1.08 3.71
THAILAND 90-99 371.70 0.13 2,480.25 6.03 7.34
TURKEY 98-99 1,496.00 0.86 3,149.98 5.31 -5.44
UK 93-98 46,583.83 1.85 18,942.57 2.61 3.75
US 90-99 55,752.60 3.65 27,344.91 2.97 5.5631
Table 2: Summary Statistics, by Country
D_MKTORIENT is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is market-oriented and equal to 0 if the
country is bank-oriented (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).  TIME is the number of business
days required for a business to become operational (Djankov et al., 2000).  SME_SHARE is the
percentage of total employment in the SME sector (Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirguc-Kunt, 2002.)
RULE OF LAW  is an index of legal and judicial efficiency (La Porta,  et al., 1998 and  Pistor,
2000.) CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index from 1 to 4 (La Porta, et al., 1998 and Pistor, 2000.)






ARGENTINA 0 71 70 French 5.35 1
AUSTRALIA 1 3 51 English 10 1
AUSTRIA 0 154 66 German 10 3
BELGIUM 0 42 69 French 10 2
CANADA 1 2 59 English 10 1
CHILE 1 78 87 French 7.02 2
COLOMBIA 0 55 67 French 2.08 0
CZECH REPUBLIC 0 97 64 Transition 8.3 3
DENMARK 1 21 69 Scandinavian 10 3
FINLAND 0 32 59 Scandinavian 10 1
FRANCE 0 53 63 French 8.98 0
GERMANY 0 90 60 German 9.23 3
GREECE 0 53 87 French 6.18 1
HONG KONG 1 41 62 French 8.22 4
HUNGARY 0 53 46 Transition 8.7 3.75
IRELAND 0 25 67 English 7.8 1
ITALY 0 121 80 French 8.33 2
JAPAN 0 50 72 German 8.98 2
NETHERLANDS 1 68 76 French 10 2
NEW ZEALAND 0 17 61 English 10 3
NORWAY 0 24 59 Scandinavian 10 2
PERU 1 171 62 French 2.5 0
POLAND 0 26 68 Transition 8.7 2.25
PORTUGAL 0 99 63 French 8.68 1
RUSSIA 0 69 80 Transition 3.7 3
SINGAPORE 1 36 13 English 8.57 4
SOUTH AFRICA 1 30 44 English 4.42 3
SOUTH KOREA 1 46 82 German 5.35 3
SPAIN 0 83 80 French 7.8 2
SWEDEN 1 17 61 Scandinavian 10 2
SWITZERLAND 1 88 73 German 10 1
THAILAND 1 39 87 French 6.25 3
TURKEY 1 55 61 French 5.18 2
UNITED KINGDOM 1 11 56 English 8.57 4
















D_CRISIS 0.018 -0.311 1.000
R_INTEREST -0.227 -0.191 0.008 1.000
SME_SHARE -0.204 0.177 -0.154 -0.212 1.000
TIME -0.140 -0.022 -0.142 0.189 0.273 1.000
D_MKTORIENT -0.047 0.218 -0.203 0.019 0.015 -0.269 1.000
CREDITOR
RIGHTS -0.029 0.012 0.077 -0.145 -0.147 -0.109 0.193 1.000
RULE OF LAW 0.774 -0.134 0.069 -0.370 -0.252 -0.279 -0.102 0.063 1.000Table 4: Cross-Country Regressions
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.  The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.  LN(GDPPC)
is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the 1-year growth rate of real GDP.   D_SYSTCRISIS is a
dummy equal to 1 in the case of a systemic bank crisis ( Caprio and Klingebiel, 2000).
RINTEREST is real interest rates.  D_MKTORIENT is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is
market-oriented and equal to 0 if the country is bank-oriented  (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine,
1999).  TIME is the number of business days required for a business to become operational
(Djankov et al., 2000).  SME_SHARE is the percentage of total employment in the SME sector
(Klapper and Sulla, 2002.)  t-statistics are in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.





































































Country Dummies No No No No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.14 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.91
Observations 273 273 265 243 2731
Table 5: Cross-Country Regressions with Legal Origins and Legal Efficiency
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.  The
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.  LN(GDPPC)
is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the 1-year growth rate of real GDP.   D_SYSTCRISIS is a
dummy equal to 1 in the case of a systemic bank crisis ( Caprio and Klingebiel, 2000).
RINTEREST is real interest rates.  FRENCH, GERMAN, and SCANDINAVIAN are dummies
indicating legal origin (La Porta, et al., 1998). RULE OF LAW is an assessment of the “efficiency
and integrity” of the legal environment as measure by Business International Corp (La Porta, et
al. 1998 and Berkowitz, et al., 2000.)  CREDITOR RIGHTS is the sum of dummies identifying
Restrictive Reorganizations, No Automatic Stay on Assets, Secured Creditors Paid First, and
Management Does Not stay in Reorganization (La Porta, et al., 1998 and Pistor, 2000.) t-statistics
are in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal

























































































Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.50 0.17 0.50 0.14 0.17
Observations 273 273 273 273 2732
Table 6: Cross-Country Regressions with Creditor Rights and Legal Efficiency
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.
Transition countries are excluded from all regressions because of the unavailability of
disaggregated creditor rights.  The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with
robust standard errors.  LN(GDPPC) is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the 1-year growth
rate of real GDP.   D_SYSTCRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 in the case of a systemic bank crisis
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 2000).  RINTEREST is real interest rates.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is the
sum of dummies identifying Restrictive Reorganizations, No Automatic Stay on Assets, Secured
Creditors Paid First, and Management Does Not stay in Reorganization (La Porta, et al., 1998)
RULE OF LAW  is an assessment of the “efficiency and integrity” of the legal environment as
measure by Business International Corp (La Porta, et al. 1998 and Pistor, 2000.) t-statistics are in
parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.






























































































Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.18
Observations 252 252 252 252 2523
Table 7: Cross-Country Regressions with Creditor Rights and Legal Efficiency
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.  Transition
countries are excluded from all regressions because of the unavailability of disaggregated creditor rights.
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.  LN(GDPPC) is the
log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the 1-year growth rate of real GDP.   D_SYSTCRISIS is a dummy equal
to 1 in the case of a systemic bank crisis (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2000).  RINTEREST is real interest rates.
CREDITOR RIGHTS is the sum of dummies identifying Restrictive Reorganizations, No Automatic Stay
on Assets, Secured Creditors Paid First, and Management Does Not stay in Reorganization (La Porta, et
al., 1998), RULE OF LAW is an assessment of the “efficiency and integrity” of the legal environment as
measure by Business International Corp (La  Porta, et al. 1998 and  Pistor, 2000.) t-statistics are in
parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.









































































































RULE OF LAW * NO
AUTOMATIC STAY ON ASSETS
0.1785*
(1.88)








Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.23
Observations 252 252 252 252 2524
Appendix 1:  Sources of Bankruptcy Data
Country Source
AUSTRALIA Australian Securities and Investment Commission
BELGIUM National Statistical Office
CANADA Office of The Superintendent Of Bankruptcy
CHILE Fiscal Nacional De Quiebras
COLOMBIA Supersociedades
CZECH REPUBLIC European Bank of Research and Development (EBRD)
DENMARK Statistics Denmark
FINLAND Statistics Finland
FRANCE Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE)
GERMANY Wirtschaftsanalyse
GREECE National Statistical Service of Greece
HONG KONG Government of Hong Kong
HUNGARY EBRD
IRELAND Dept of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
ITALY Annuario di Statisticeh Giudiziarie
JAPAN Teikoku Data Bank
KOREA OECD Special Report
NETHERLANDS Statistics Netherland




PORTUGAL Ministry of Justice
RUSSIA Russian Economic Trends Quarterly – Center for Economic Reforms
SINGAPORE Official Receiver and Public Trustee Office, Singapore
SPAIN National (Spanish) Statistics Institute
SWEDEN Statistics Sweden
SWITZERLAND Schweizerischen Verband Creditform
THAILAND Statistical Office
TURKEY Government of Turkey
UNITED KINGDOM Department of Trade and Industry
UNITED STATES American Bankruptcy Institute